I.
I. INTRODUCTION
We approach this Israel-Palestine crisis from multiple perspectives in hopes toof illuminating e the underlying
dynamics and forecast the future of this protracted confrontation. We first describe frame the Palestinian-Israel conflict withinin terms of the power transition framework to
anticipate the long-term trends in that conflict. Our analysis indicates
this is a volatile confrontation that is likely to escalate with the rise of
Palestinian capabilities. Negotiation now is superior to negotiation later. We further analyze the immediate changes in this sub-hierarchy
by analyzing the costs to the combatants. Our
analysis suggests that the willingness
to bring about a workable ceasefire and eventually a peace settlement between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority can emerge if the two sides become
sufficiently exhausted in order to make the compromises required to attain an
agreement. Thus, as the
number of Israeli fatalities–-both civilian and military-sustained in the Intifada
approaches those sustained by the Palestinians—we
anticipate that the negotiating positions of the two sides will converge toward
acceptance of a genuine ceasefire.
Based on these structural assessments
we evaluate the prospects for a
negotiated settlement in the near future. This study forecasts the outcome ofa
very low likelihood of a negotiations cease-fire
or a negotiated settlement to achieve an
effective ceasefire in the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict across two following the January 2003 elections (points in time. Previous analysis set the stage for these
evaluations Organski, 1999; Kugler 2002). In this paper tThe first is evaluation is set in October 2002 when
Israel’s national unity government was still in power. That analysis suggested that
next to no positive improvement in the
current situationwould emerge
without direct outside intervention. by tThe “Quartet”— the United Nations, the
European Union, Russia and the U.S. could nudge
the extremes of both parties together but cannot dislodge – without considerable movement far more commitment
of Chairman Yasser Arafat and Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon from their current
commitment to protracted, if limited violence. The second evaluation is based on data obtained in is November 2002 after the dissolution of the
national unity government and prior to the replacement of Binyamin
Ben-Eliezer by Amram Mitzna as leader of Israel’s Labor Party. Assuming another Likud-Labor “unity” governmenWe show that even ift
(which assumes that Ariel Sharon accepts accommodates
some of Mitzna’s policy positions which in turn
would pushing the Israeli government toward negotiation with the Palestinian Authority’s positionAuthority),
we forecast a reduction, but not an
elimination of generalized violence by is the likely outcome. A negotiated solution close
to that available in November 2000 is now far off. most
of the parties.
The analysis is based on the
assumption that willingness to bring about a workable ceasefire and eventually
a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority can only emerge
if the two sides become
sufficiently exhausted in order to make the compromises required to attain an
agreement. As the number of Israeli
fatalities–-both civilian and military-sustained in the Intifada approaches
those sustained by the Palestinian Authority, including other resistance groups as well as
civilians—the negotiating positions of the two sides will tend to converge
toward the acceptance of a genuine ceasefire.
A significant decline in the
ratio of Palestinian to Israeli fatalities, from 12:1 in September 2000 to almost 1:1 by June 2002,
indicated increased fighting effectiveness on the Palestinian side even as
their absolute number of casualties is higher in some months than in the
September 2000 Intifada onset. Israel’s
incentive to rethink its diplomatic options
is sensitivity to casualties. We expect
that military responses including the occupation of Palestinian cities and
towns will ultimately prove ineffective in ending acts of terror (as measured
by number of casualties). At this point, Israeli leaders should begin to seriously reanalyze
diplomatic solutions. The Palestinians’
incentive to do the same is their near inability to maintain a functioning
economy due to conditions imposed by the nearly continual occupation and
lockdown of their major cities and
towns which is leading to the total unraveling of their civil society
II. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONSPolicy makers correctly assess the Middle East crisis as a
protracted complex, volatile and very divisive
confrontation. Despite
such characteristics this is
not an
“unsolvable”
crisis.
Indeed, France, and Germany were involved in a more protracted, more complex,
more volatile and more divisive
confrontation. Today these nations are part of the European Union!
The purpose of this
paper is to analyze the Israel-Palestine
crisis with structural and decision models in the belief that such analysis could help policy
makers to anticipate the course of future events
and identify the strategic
opportunities that may diffuse and ultimately settle this
protracted confrontation.
I.
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
The Power Transition Perspective
From a structural perspective, the Middle East
offers a number of interrelated challenges. Figure 1
catalogs major protracted
crisis points in the Middle East from a power transition angle of vision to place the Israel-Palestine conflict in
perspective.
FIGURE
1. PROTRACTED CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
Following 9/11
confrontations between Muslim and
non-Muslim nations tend to be
lumped together. Figure 1 shows clearly that different confrontations
have very diverse structural characteristics. These structural differences can help us understand
what types of solutions are applicable to each crisis.
Figure 1 compares the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinian authority to other asymmetric conflicts, such as Afghanistan,
Kashmir and Chechnya. Figure
1 shows that in the Afghanistan and Kashmir crisies the non-state challengers
are declining in relation to the
nation-state defenders. In such long protracted confrontations the
defender has the upper hand because the challenger – despite its
dissatisfaction – eventually runs out of
resources. This is the case here. In
Afghanistan the dissatisfied parties confront long odds as the
overwhelming capability advantage and technology edge falls with the United States and its allies. The ultimate
outcome of this crisis will be dictated by the degree of commitment the United States is
willing to allocate to settle.
Figure 1 also allows one to place the Afghanistan
crisis in perspective. This is not a massive
confrontation. Recall that after World War II US troops remained
in place for years supported by the
massive Marshal Plan. The objective of
this dual military-economic commitment was to change the minds of the
population. After World War II, Germany’s population was persuaded to abandon
their commitment to Nazi principles and replace them with democratic processes. It took
half a decade before political
structures were sufficiently stable for West Germany join NATO. A similar commitment to a much
smaller package would be required to set Afghanistan on the road to recovery. Figure 1 shows that in today’s
Afghanistan success depends on the
ability to persuade the
population to abandon their commitment and support for the international aims of Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. The critical
difference between Germany after World War
II,
and Afghanistan today is that while
Germany and World War II posed a direct danger to the United States and the global hierarchy, Afghanistan and
the Middle East do not and cannot. However, the
small group of Al Qaeda international
terrorists unlike their Nazi
counterparts are not directly linked to
Afghanistan. International terrorists can easily
move to any other nation without reducing the danger they pose. The solution
for international terrorism is therefore
not strictly military but largely political.
Figure 1 also shows that ins strength are
l is likewise
confronting overwhelming odds against
Russian troops. Chechnya is
a domestic rather than an international conflict. Chechens are
“domestic terrorists” or
“guerrillas” who use civilian casualties to advance their goals.
Unlike Al Qaeda international terrorists, Chechen actors do not present
a clear danger for countries other than Russia. Structural
analysis – supported by more detailed stakeholder
evaluations - suggests
that Russia can achieve a settlement by
either military or
political means. The
military solution would require raising Russia’s commitment to the conflict in Chechnya substantially
since estimates indicate that over 80%
of the Chechen fighters would have to be killed or captured before stability
could be attained (Abdollahian, Efrid, Kugler, 2000). If Russia chooses to maintain this course it will have to endure the cost is continuing domestic instability and
exposure to terrorist activities emanating from this region into the rest of
Russia. This conflict can also be
settled if Russia chooses political accommodation by either sharply increases the level of autonomy or by allowing an
independent Chechnya to emerge. All options are
therefore in Russia’s corner.
Figure 1 shows that the structure
of the protracted conflict in Kashmir is presents another structureppreponderant
nation that can choose to impose its preferences through a protracted
conventional confrontation. In Kashmir, India, like Russia in Chechnya
faces an internal crisis that can be resolved by force or by political
accommodation. Kashmir, the only a preponderantly Muslim state within India is likely to
continue to be a source of serious dissent unless granted effective autonomy or
independence. Given the structural
constraints in place, India’s elites
will decide how whether this conflict will be resolved or waged in the next generation. Most
important, an international conflict
involving Pakistan is increasingly unlikely. The relative capabilities of these two countries
are so asymmetric that – short of
intervention by China or the US that could alter this relationship - a repetition of the previous wars would end in
swift disaster for Pakistan.
Nuclear weapons are sometimes mentioned
as the great equalizer. Structural analysis based on Power tTransition suggests that nuclear capabilities do not change
dramatically this equation. While the cost
of conflict would no doubt be increased by a potential
nuclear exchange, the overwhelming conventional superiority of combined with the current nuclear parity allows India the upper hand. Moreover, the economic disparity between these two
nations suggests – like in
the case of Russia over Ukraine – an that the overwhelming superiority of India over
Pakistan will be preserved in the
future, and the later can exercise its preferences in Kashmir. This is the reason for the strong and successful demands made by India in the recent 2002
flare-up of this protracted conflict.
These
three important crisies in the
Middle East show that IThis
The crises may
persist but in the long term they will
be settled or diffused by actions of the regionally dominant non-Muslim
societies. The confrontation between Israel and Palestine is
structurally very different. The most dangerous and intense confrontation in the
Middle East – and the focus of this
analysis - is the dispute over the future of Palestine. The Israel-Palestine confrontation is different
from the previous three crisis here
the dissatisfied Palestinians are growing relative
to the satisfied Israelis factions. Thus, the longer this conflict remains unresolved, the larger the demands from the Palestinian side are expected to be. Like the conflict in Kashmir, the Israel- Palestinian
conflict is a relatively young conflict.
The division of Israel-Palestine achieveddivision of Israel-Palestine was achieved first
by UN decree in 1947 and then expanded
by conflict with the first armistice in 1949 and
ending with the outcome of the 1973 war. Prior to that period – unlike confrontations
in Europe between France, Germany and England or the long history of conflict in Chechnya –
interactions between Arab and Jew were
no different than in other regions. Indeed, the
Palestine-Israel open confrontation was
triggered by the large forced migration of refugees
following World War II that impacted this sub-region profoundly and permanently.
Figure 1 shows that
the dissatisfied Palestinian population is gaining in strength relative to the
satisfied Israelis. The dynamics in this structure
sdirection of change suggests that early settlement could have
produced a more favorable outcome for Israel than a delayed
settlement. Indeed, had a Palestine
state been created following the 1973
war the preponderant Israel could
have drawn the new
boarders almost at will. This is no longer the case. As the relative power of Israel declines in
relation to Palestine and neighboring
dissatisfied Arab nations, Palestinian dissatisfaction enhanced by
occupation is expected to grow and fuel resistance.
This dynamic in turn affects negotiation postures. As
dissatisfaction grows along with relative power, the terms of settlement become increasingly difficult
to reach or impose. Unfortunately, in the Israeli-Palestine
confrontation, both sides bypassed many opportunities for peace. Among the earliest under Golda Mayer in the late
1970’s prior to the deployment of settlements, the latest during the failed 2000 Clinton’s
-led negotiations that almost reached its goals
Unlike in the case
of India, Russia and the US where choices favor the status quo nations, the choices
facing the Israeli government today are
whether to continue policies of Palestinian containment and military engagement and postpone a settlement, or pursue
policies that lead to a partition resented by both parties. Given the
results in Figure 1, Israel is no longer
absolutely preponderant and can no
longer impose a unilateral settlement, but given the still asymmetric strength of the two parties, Israel can lead the
negotiation process towards a stable outcome.
What this paper investigates is precisely
if such a settlement can be reached.
The Structure of Casualties
The analysis is based on the
assumption that willingness to bring about a workable ceasefire and eventually
a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority can only emerge
if the two sides become sufficiently exhausted in order to make the compromises
required to attain an agreement. As the
number of Israeli fatalities–-both civilian and military-sustained in the Intifada
approaches those sustained by the Palestinian Authority, including other
resistance groups as well as civilians—the negotiating positions of the two
sides will tend to converge toward the acceptance of a genuine ceasefire.
A significant decline in the ratio of
Palestinian to Israeli fatalities, from 12:1 in September 2000 to almost 1:1 by
June 2002, indicated increased fighting effectiveness on the Palestinian side
even as their absolute number of casualties is higher in some months than in
the September 2000 Intifada onset.
Israel’s incentive to rethink its diplomatic options is sensitivity to
casualties. We expect that military
responses including the occupation of Palestinian cities and towns will
ultimately prove ineffective in ending acts of terror (as measured by number of
casualties). At this point, Israeli leaders should begin to seriously reanalyze
diplomatic solutions. The Palestinians’
incentive to do the same is their near inability to maintain a functioning
economy due to conditions imposed by the nearly continual occupation and
lockdown of their major cities and towns which is leading to the total
unraveling of their civil society.
Civil society refers to the collection of groups and associations that
falls between the family and the state. Some scholars consider it critical to the
success of establishing democracy.
Casualties measure the intensity of a
conflict. As President Reagan accurately
pointed out in his challenge of the stability of deterrence and the
need for a Nuclear Shield, developed societies are less willing to see their citizens die in a
confrontation with a developing society. Deterrence under Mutual Assured Destruction is therefore unstable against societies willing to
lose large portions of their population to attain their goals.
Indeed, the advantage that developed
societies have over their developing brethren is that regardless of outcome, in direct conflict casualties
among troops from developed societies are far lower than
among troops from developing societies. Vietnam
and Afghanistan are effective illustrations of the principle
that a developing society can win a conflict but
only if it is willing to sacrifice many
more of its population in a
confrontation with a developed society.
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Figure 2
Monthly Death Tolls for Israelis and
Palestinians
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